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INHERENT LIMITATIONS UPON IMPEACHMENT
The Constitution of the State of New York only inferentially
declares who are subject to impeachment and is silent as to what
constitutes an impeachable offence. In this it differs from the
Constitution of 1777, and is in sharp contrast to the Constitution
of 1822. The constitutions of other states, with few exceptions,
define impeachable offences and specify the officers who may be
brought to trial before an impeachment court. While some care-
fully provide that this formidable process cannot be escaped by
resignation or the cessation of official term, none prescribes that
any sort of antecedent misconduct may be the subject of an im-
peachment proceeding.
In the impeachment of Governor Sulzer the charges which are
the chief reliance of the prosecution relate to alleged acts oc-
curring, it is true, in the brief interval between election and ac-
cession to the governorship, but nevertheless antedating his as-
sumption of office. The question-and it is of the gravest import
-is: Can the governor be impeached and removed for acts done
prior to the time he took office? It matters not that the acts if
committed were of such a nature as properly to draw upon him
public odium. The question is whether any misconduct prior
to inauguration can be the subject of impeachment proceedings.
It is not the fortunes of a particular individual that are at stake.
The discussion rises above personalities and is lifted from the
arena of politics into the atmosphere of abstract principles. The
value of a right decision is enhanced by the fact that the Constitu-
tion puts the possible control into the hands of what might be a
minority of the entire membership of the court, and, as history
teaches, minorities are often swayed by factional or partisan
sentiment.
The New York State Convention of 1777 created a court for
the trial of impeachments and the correction of errors under
regulations to be established by the legislature. The court was
to consist of the president of the Senate for the time being, the
senators, the chancellor, and the judges of the Supreme Court, or
the major part of them. Should an impeachment be prosecuted
This article was prepared and used, not publicly, before the beginning
of the impeachment trial of William Sulzer as Governor of New York.-
Ed.
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against the chancellor or either of the judges of the Supreme
Court, the person so impeached was to be suspended from office
until his acquittal. Power to impeach all officers of the state
for mal and corrupt conduct in their respective offices was vested
in the representatives of the people in Assembly, but the consent
of two-thirds of the members present was required to an im-
peachment. A special oath was to be taken by the members of
the impeachment court "truly and impartially to try and deter-
mine the charge in question according to the evidence." A vote
of two-thirds of the members present was essential to conviction.
Punishment was not to extend beyond removal from office and
disqualification to hold or enjoy any place of honor, trust or
profit under the state. The convicted party was, however, to
remain liable to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment ac-
cording to the laws of the land.
Chapter 11, Laws of 1784, made provision for the procedure
in impeachment cases. All impeachments were to be delivered
to the president of the Senate, who was immediately to cause the
court to be summoned. The court was then to cause the person
impeached to appear or be brought before it to answer the charge
against him. Upon his appearance he was to receive a copy of
the impeachment and be allowed reasonable time to plead or
answer. Whenever issue was joined the court was to appoint a
time and place for the trial. The clerk of the court was to
administer the special oath to the president of the Senate, who, in
turn, was to administer it to the other members of the tribunal.
In case of the impeachment of the president of the Senate, notice
was immediately to be given by the Assembly to the Senate in
order that another president might be appointed. These pro-
visions were subsequently embodied in an act of the legislature
passed February 12, 1801.
By the Constitution of 1822 the court was to consist of the
president of the Senate (the words of the former Constitution
"for the time being" having ben omitted), the senators, the chan-
cellor and the justices (not judges) of "the Supreme Court, or the
major part of them. The power of impeachment was restricted:
the Assembly was authorized to impeach all civil officers of the
state for mal and corrupt conduct in office and for high crimes
and misdemeanors. Impeachment could, however, be voted by
a majority of the members elected. The words of the former
Constitution, that the impeachment court should be instituted
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"under regulations to be established by the legislature" were
dropped. In all other respects the impeachment provisions of
the first Constitution were continued in force.
The only clause relative to impeachment in the Constitution of
1846, is section 1 of Article VI, which is as follows:
"The assembly shall have the power of impeachment, by the
vote of the majority of all the members elected. The court for
the trial of impeachments shall be composed of the president of
the senate, the senators, or a major part of them, and the judges
of the court of app.als, or the major part of them. On the trial
of an impeachment against the governor, the lieutenant-governor
shall not act as a member of the court. No judicial officer shall
exe, cise his office after he shall have been impeached, until he shall
have been acquitted. Before the trial of an impeachment, the
members of the court shall take an oath or affirmation, truly and
impartially to try the impeachment, according to the evidence;
and no person shall be convicted, without the concurrence of two-
thirds of the members present. Judgment in cases of impeach-
ment shall not extend further than to removal from office, or
removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any
office of honor, trust, or profit, under this state; but the party
impeached shall be liable to indictment and punishment according
to law."
The changes made by this Constitution are, first, its failure to
specify what should constitute an impeachable offence and,
secondly, its addition of the sentence: "On the trial of an im-
peachment against the governor, the lieutenant-governor shall not
act as a member of the court." The court itself was reconstituted,
for the chancellorship had been abolished and a new court of
appeals created to take the place of the old court of errors. The
radical alterations wrought in the judicial system in 1846 were
the substitution of an elective, for an appointive, judiciary, the
amalgamtion of courts of law and equity, and the creation of a
amalgamation of courts of law and equity, and the creation of a
little debate, but the subject of the reconstitution of the
judicial system was discussed at length. Voluminous as
were the discussions upon this subject, there was no mention of
the reasons which actuated the Judiciary Committee of the Con-
vention in omitting all reference to impeachable offences, nor was
there any inquiry from any delegate as to the cause for this
omission.
The Constitutional Convention of 1867 proposed but one
change in respect of impeachments. The Constitution of 1846
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had provided: "No judicial officer shall exercise his office after
he shall have been impeached, until he shall have been acquitted."
For this sentence there was substituted by the Convention of
1867 the following: "No judicial officer shall exercise his office,
after articles of impeachment against him shall have been pre-
ferred to the Senate, until he shall have been acquitted." The
judiciary article framed by the Convention of 1867 was ratified
by the people in the election of 1869 and thereupon became part
of the state's organic law. The question as to what constituted
an impeachable offence seems never to have been discussed upon
the floor of the Convention. No one asked what power of
impeachment the Assembly possessed or" with what jurisdiction
the court of impeachment was clothed. The probabilities are
that the attention of no member of the Convention was drawn to
the subject.
The only change made by the Constitution of 1894 in the pro-
visions regarding impeachment was in the sentence which reads:
"On the trial of an impeachment against the governor, the lieu-
tenant-governor shall not act as a member of the court." This
sentence was altered to read: "On the trial of an impeachment
against the governor or lieutenant-governor, the lieutenant-gov-
ernor shall not act as a member of the court."
This brief review shows that although the earlier constitutions
of the state contained definitions of impeachable offences, the
definition was eliminated in 1846 and apparently without dis-
cussion; and that neither in the Convention of that year nor in
any subsequent Constitutional Convention did any delegate in-
quire as to what latent meaning was behind the words "power of
impeachment." The question now arises whether the power of
impeachment under the present Constitution extends to all of-
fences, whenever committed, which the court of impeachment
may decide to be proper subjects for its cognizance. Has the
Constitution created a court which may decide for itself what
constitutes an impeachable act and take cognizance of any charge
at its pleasure? Is not this equivalent to conferring upon the
court a discretionary power of removal? Was it the intention of
the framers of the organic law to vest the impeachment court with
such arbitrary discretion? In answer the language of Judge
Story in an analogous case seems pertinent and forcible. Such a
discretion "is so incompatible with the genius of our institutions
that no lawyer or statesman would be inclined to countenance so
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absolute a despotism of opinion and practice, which might make
that a crime at one time or in one person, which would be deemed
innocent at another time or in another person."
It is claimed by some that the power of impeachment conferred
by the Constitution of 1846 and continued in successive Constitu-
tions reaches all offences whenever committed which the court of
impeachment might decide to be proper subjects for its cogniz-
ance, or, differently stated, that the Constitution imports that the
court of impeachment shall be the absolute judge of the extent
of its own jurisdiction. There can be no review of the judgment
of the court. Its judgment may not only depose the official
brought before it, but preclude his holding any other political
office in the state. The court for the trial of impeachments is
in reality a court of criminal jurisdiction. The prosecution is a
criminal prosecution. An impeachment is commonly likened to
an indictment.
The argument for this broad jurisdiction of the impeachment
court is thus presented in Bench and Bar, August, 1913:
"Our Constitution contains no specifications or limitations of
the grounds for impeachment. The obvious and accepted pur-
pose of such a proceeding is to remove an officer who is mentally
or morally unfit for the duties and responsibilities of his office.
So the framers of our Constitution have wisely omitted to define
or delimit the causes for which an impeachment will lie. The
sufficiency of the charges against the officer impeached is left to
the determination of the Court for the Trial of Impeachments,
which is conposed of senators and judges of the Court of Appeals
and within the scope of its jurisdiction is the highest court of the
state. That court alone has authority to decide whether, upon
the facts proved, the officer impeached is worthy of the trust and
confide-ce of the Deople and fit to continue in office, and from the
determination of that court there is no appeal."
It cannot be denied that authors and commentators have given
expression to this point of view. The impeaching body has
sometimes been styled the grand inquest of the state, with author-
ity to ascertain whether any cause exists for the removal of a
public officer, although he may have committed no indictable
offence or broken any positive law. The jurisdiction of the im-
peachment court must upon this theory be commensurate; it
must have authority to determine whether the offence charged
has been committed and is of such a nature as to warrant a judg-
ment of removal from office. Senator Charles Sumner of
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Massachusetts was an able exponent of this theory. In his
opinion pronouncing President Andrew Johnson guilty upon all
the impeachment articles that had been preferred by the House of
Representatives, he argued that impeachment was a power broad
as the Constitution itself and applicable to the president, vice-
president and all civil officers through whom the Republic might
suffer, or in any way be imperilled. Said he:
"Show me an act of evil. example or influence committed by a
president, and I show you an impeachable offence, which becomes
great in proporticn to the scale on which it is done and the conse-
quences which are menaced. The Republic must receive no
detriment; and impeachment is one of the powers of the Consti-
tution by which this sovereign rule is maintained."
The Sumner theory was not sustained by the verdict of the
Senate. Almost all the state constitutions adopted since the
Johnson trial have scrupulously defined impeachable offences.
The sentiment of the country as expressed in constitutional law
since that trial has denied the existence of such boundless author-
ity in the impeaching body or the impeachment court unless, per-
chance, the repetition in the New York Constitution of 1894 of
the provisions of the Constitution of 1846 be regarded as approval
of the Sumner theory. This doctrine is tantamount to the broad-
est kind of recall of public officials, limited only by the formalities
of an impeachment trial, in which, however, the spirit of faction
may destroy all sense of justice. It would be particularly dan-
gerous in its application to judges. However attractive the
notion of a tribunal invested with power to condemn and degrade
a public official for what it may in its sovereign judgment deem to
be adequate cause, it is subversive of all sound principles, if not
at war with.all precedents. The proposition of the advocates
of this extraordinary power is nothing less than this: That a
court has been constituted with power to determine the extent of
its own jurisdiction, which may be narrower or broader as the.
demands of party or faction require. The court supposedly
vested with this authority may, so far as the potential part of it
is concerned, be composed of less than a majority of all the
persons entitled to sit in it! In other words, twenty or it may
be twenty-one of the fifty-one members of the State Senate and
of the seven or ten judges of the Court of Appeals, constitute the
court, for this small number may not only decide what is an im-
peachable offence, adjudge the accused guilty and remove him
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from office, but may also debar him from ever thereafter holding
an office of trust or profit within the state.2  Could a scheme
better fitted to enable faction to control government ever have
been devised? The impeachment and conviction are in reality
ex post facto, for it could not be known in advance that the act
charged would come within the scope of impeachable offences
and the court is the sole judge of its own jurisdiction! Such a
system, however eloquently its apologists may plead for it, is a
mockery of constitutional government and would constitute the
worst kind of tyranny.
That the full consequences of the views of the impeachment
managers may be appreciated it must be remembered that the
judges of all the higher courts are amenable to impeachment.
Should the spirit of party or faction become sufficiently formid-
able hardly a judge upon the bench would be secure against a
movement to depose him. He could be removed not alone for
some transgression in office but for any misdeed, however remote
in time, which the court of impeachment might in its absolute dis-
cretion choose to consider ground for unseating him. Once given
such free range, hatred or vindictiveness would surely find some
charge upon which to impeach, and perhaps convict. The purer
and less blemished the character of the jurist, the higher his
reputation, the more commanding his position, the greater might
be the danger of his removal from office, because in the fearless
discharge of his duties he might have incurred the enmity of
powers capable of influencing legislative bodies for sinister ends.
Since the Constitution of New York vests the "power of im-
peachment" in the Assembly, the question at once arises, what is
the extent of that power? Is the power a well defined thing?
Are there unerring precedents to which appeal can be made?
Was it the intention of the people to clothe the court for the trial
of impeachments with jurisdiction to treat any offence as an
2 In New York a constitutional quorum of the court would consist of
26 senators and four judges of the Court of Appeals, or if the Supreme
Court justices designated to sit in the Court of Appeals, thereby become
members of the court, it would consist of 26 senators and six judges. A
vote of two-thirds of the tribunal, which would be 21 or 22, according to
circumstances, could convict. If the practice followed in the Barnard
case and in the Archbald case should control, it would be in the power
of 16 or 17 members to impose the sentence. In those cases it was held
that while a two-thirds vote was necessary to convict, a majority vote
could determine the judgment.
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impeachable one? The power as exercised in history has never, I
think, been held to extend so far as to include acts committed
before assumption of office.
In order to determine the meaning of the words the "power of
impeachment" as used in the organic law of this state, light may
be sought from the practice in England, the history of impeach-
ment cases under the Federal Constitution and the earlier cases
in this state. The question may then be examined upon principle.
1. The practice of impeachment by the Commons at the bar
of the Lords dates from the reign of Edward IIL Anson, in his
Treatise on the Law and Custom of the English Constitution,
says:
"It shou'd be distinguished from the system of appeals in Par-
liament by which private accusers endeavored to get a trial before
Parliament of the person whom they charged with an offence.
The Lords had declared in 1387 that the case of any high crime
touching the Kirg's person and the state of his realm committed
by the peers of the realm with others should be dealt with -in
Parliament. Such a court bound by no settled rules, and dis-
regarding the advice of the judges might create the offence and
the penalty in the course of its judicial proceedings; such appeals
were forbidden by Henry IV. They revive in an altered form
in the Acts of Attainder by which in the later part of the fifteenth
and throughout the sixteenth century persons who had played for
a high stake in politics and lost it or who by no fault of their own
cba-ced to be on the unpopular side, were hurried to death with
no form of trial."
Elsewhere in the same Treatise, Anson says:
"Impeachment was a valuable weapon when it was first insti-
tuted in the fourteenth century and again when its practice was
revived by the Commons in 1621 under kings who were ready to
sustain the Constitution to the point of rebellion. It was then
important to strike a heavy blow at the instruments of the royal
will. * * *
"The Commons were prepared to assume that the acts of the
g-'vernment were the acts of the King's Ministers, not of the
King himself; but they wanted to be able to punish an erring
Minister if they could be sure of punishing the right man. The
punishment was clumsy enough, impeachment or attainder result-
ing in exile, imprisonment, fine or death-until it came to be
understood that the expression of popular disapproval shown by
a vote of the House of Commons or the results of a general
election was a sign that the entire Ministry must be changed or
that a Minister who had acted on his own responsibility must
leave office."
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"The right of impeachment begins in 51, Edward III, in a
time of great administrative abuses under a king in his dotage"
(Gneist, History of English Constitutions, Vol. II, p. 18).
As early as 15, Edward III, Parliament resolved:
"No peer of the land, crown official, or other, on account of his
office, can b- brought before the court, * * * rendcred responsible
or judged otherwise than through the award of the peers in Par-
liament,"
which seems to imply that it was misconduct in office for which
an official of the government was to be arraigned with a view to
his removal. Clashes may have occasionally occurred between
the House of Commons, the indicting or impeaching body, and
the House of Lords, the impeachment court, as for example, in
the case of Edward Fitzharris in 1681. Fitzharris, says Green,
in his History of the English People, was not a public officer, but
a mere informer, and was entitled as a commoner to a trial by
a jury of his peers in the courts of the common law. When the
House resolved to impeach, the Lords suspended the proceeding.
The House in reply passed a resolution declaring it to be their
undoubted right to impeach any peer or commoner for treason
or any other crime or misdemeanor. This was in accordance
with the broad claim made from time to time by the Commons,
and occasionally accepted by the Lords, that private individuals
were amenable to impeachment. The two Houses were in ac-
*cord in the case of Doctor Sacheverell, who was impeached and
punished for preaching seditious and treasonable sermons, in
1710.
The earliest authenticated impeachment in England is
said by some authorities to be that of Roger Mortimer, Earl of
March, for treason, in 1330. According to others the first case
was that of William, Lord Latimer, against whom charges of
gross malversation in office were presented by the Commons, near
the close of the reign of Edward III. After a trial before the
Lords, Latimer was condemned to imprisonment, as well as for-
feiture of his place. Between the impeachment of Lord Bacon
and the revolution of 1688 there were about fifty cases of im-
peachment, nineteen having taken place in the first three years of
the Long Parliament. From 1688 to the close of the reign of
George I (1727) there were fifteen. There was one in the reign
of George II, that of Lord Lovatt in 1746 for high treason. This
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was followed by the memorable trial of Warren Hastings (1788-
1794), and by that of Lord Melville in 1806.
Lord Melville's trial merits notice because its abortive result
tended to bring the process of impeachment into disrepute. Mel-
ville, an intimate friend of William Pitt and Treasurer of the
Navy, had withdrawn £10,000 of its funds from bank, and when
called to account, refused, as he said, "from motives of pub!ic duty,
private honor and personal convenience" to reveal the use which
had been made of the money. The managers of the impeachment
charged that his acts were crimes; his counsel maintained that
there was no statute under which they were punishable. With
this view a majority of the Lords concurred and Melville was
acquitted. Macaulay doubtless had this case in mind when, in
1841, in his essay upon Warren Hastings, he penned the following
paragraph:
"In truth it is impossible to deny that impeachment, though it
is a fine ceremony and though it may have been useful in the
seventeenth century, is not a proceeding from which much good
can now be expected. Whatever confidence may be placed in
the decision of the Peers on an appeal arising out of orlinary
litigation, it is certain that no man has the least confidence in their
impartia!ity, when a great public functionary, charged with a great
state crime, is brought to their bar. They are all politicians.
There is hard'y one among them whose vote on an impeachment
may not be confidently predicted before a witness has been exam-
ined."
Records of many of these impeachment trials are no longer
extant, but it is reasonably safe to affirm that no case that arose
under the Plantagenet, the Tudor, or the Stuart kings went so
far as to question the acts of a public servant before he took
office. Impeachment was too vital, too dynamic, a proceeding to
be thus diverted. Its processes were direct. Royalty was
shielded from punishment by the maxim that the king c6uld do
no wrong; but if a minister who was the willing tool of an arbi-
trary monarch, a Strafford, for example, could be arraigned and
brought to trial for acts of tyranny and punished by imprison-
ment, exile, or even death, few ministers would for the sake of
royal favor dare to incur such an ordeal. The men who were
fashioning a weapon that would compel ministers to acknowledge
responsibility to the House of Commons struck directly at mis-
conduct in office, and probably never imagined such an em-
ployment of the process of impeachment as is suggested in these
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latter days. And as soon as the House of Commons became
able so to govern the conduct of ministers as to render it impos-
sible for them to conduct public business without parliamentary
support, impeachment ceased to have practical value. And since
judges have become removable upon the joint address of both
Houses of Parliament, a principle established during the reign of
William HI, the process of impeaching judges has fallen into
desuetude.
The phrase "treason, bribery or other high crimes and mis-
demeanors" which was taken by the framers of the Federal Con-
stitution from the parliamentary law of England, may never have
had a fixed and defined meaning in that country. The present
argument does not require that it should have had precise defini-
tion. It may have been, as has been well said, "a generalization
as broad as the mischief against which the process of impeach-
ment guards": nevertheless it would have been misapplied and
emasculated if aimed against conduct out of office save in the
exceptional cases of private citizens,-as, for instance, in the case
of Doctor Sacheverell. Those who, from time to time, have
assumed that the power as exercised in England was without any
restriction as, for example, Judge Lawrence, a distinguished
member of the House of Representatives during the impeachment
of Andrew Johnson, and author of the brief which was used by
the impeachment managers, adduce no precedent or authority to
sustain their assertions. Judge Lawrence quotes from John C.
Hamilton's Annotations upon The Federalist that
"in the delineation and construction of those [impeachable] of-
fences the nature of the proceeding can never be tied down by the
strict rules which, in common cases, limit the discretion of courts;
that the discretion of the court for the trial of impeachments, thus
unlimited in its proceedings, is 'an awful discretion', and that its
exercise was contemplated to be applied towards the most con-
fidential and the most distinguished characters of the community."
Those who seek to expand the power of impeachment by sur-
rounding it with such an atmosphere of awe, deal only in general-
ities, never cite a case; their only reliance is upon the words which
have been inherited from the English practice, to wit, "high crimes
and misdemeanors." These words, it may be acknowledged, invest
the impeachment court with "an awful discretion"; but never-
theless they designate a circumscribed area of jursidiction, how-
ever extensive it may be. It never has included the acts of a
person before he took office. Those who argue for the exist-
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ence of such a power may well be asked to produce atithority for
it. The burden is assuredly upon them.
2. Nothing in the history of impeachment proceedings in this
country lends any aid to this claim. The discussions in the con-
vention that framed the Constitution of 1787 give it no support.
The debates are throughout pervaded with the idea that the
subject of impeachment was official misconduct, that is, conduct
in office. Under the Federal Constitution there have been nine
impeachment trials. The earliest was that of Senator William
Blount of Tennessee in 1797, 1798. The charge against him was
that he had been guilty of treasonable negotiations with Great
Britain for the transfer of New Orleans. The House impeached,
the Senate expelled, him, and then proceeded to try him upon the
impeachment. Blount's counsel challenged the jurisdiction of
the impeachment court. upon two grounds: (1) that a senator
was not an officer of the United States within section 4, Article
II, of the Constitution, which provides that "the President, Vice-
President, and all civil officers of the United States shall be re-
moved from office on impeachmefit for and conviction of treason,
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors"; (2) that owing
to his expulsion he had ceased to be a senator. The Senate sus-
tained the first plea and the case was dismissed.
Concerning Blount's impeachment,, Jefferson thus expressed
himself in a letter to Madison, February 8, 1798:
"I see nothing in the mode of proceeding by impeachment but
the most formidable weapon for the purposes of dominant faction
that ever was contrived. It would be the most effectual one of
getting rid of any man whom they'consider as dangerous to their
views. * * * I know of no solid purpose of punishment which the
courts of law are not equal to and history shows that in England
impeachment has been an engine more of passion than of justice."
In 1803 Judge John Pickering of the Federal Court of New
Hampshire was impeached and afterwards removed for drunken-
ness and profanity on the bench. Samuel Chase, one of the asso-
ciate justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, was
impeached in 1804 for various offences, all said to have occurred
in office, and was fried in 1805 before the Senate. At the trial,
which resulted in Chase's acquittal, Aaron Burr, then Vice-Presi-
dent of the United States, presided, and history records that he
made a model presiding officer. In 1831 Judge James H. Peck
of the Federal Court of Missouri was impeached for punishing
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as contempt of court certain criticisms upon his judicial opinions.
He was defended with great ability and eloquence by William
Wirt and acquitted. In 1862 Judge West H. Humphreys of the
Federal District Court of Tennessee was impeached upon the
charge of aiding the rebellion and removed from office. His
treasonable c6nduct occurred during his incumbency of the bench.
Next came President Johnson's case. All the articles of impeach-
ment referred to some form of misconduct in office. Even the
speeches in which he was said to have made improper and dis-
respectful reference to Congress were delivered during his term
of office. In 1876 Secretary of War W. W. Belknap was im-
peached for bribery in office, but he resigned while the impeach-
ment was in preparation, and President Grant accepted his resig-
nation. Articles of impeachment were subsequently preferred.
Belknap denied the jurisdiction of the court, as he had ceased to
be an officer of the United States before the proceeding was
begun. A majority of the Senate voted to overrule the plea, the
trial proceeded and resulted in failure to convict. The senators
were undoubtedly influenced by the fact that as he had resigned,
the Senate had lost jurisdiction of the case. Judge Charles
Swayne of the District Court of the United States, District of
Florida, was impeached in 1905 for misconduct in office and
acquitted.
In 1912 articles of impeachment were preferred by the House
of Representatives against Robert W .Archbald, United States
Circuit Judge, sitting as a member of the Commerce Court. It
was the first successful impeachment of a Federal judge since the
Civil War and a demonstration of the efficiency of the time-hon-
ored remedy for checking judicial misbehavior. Of the thirteen
articles presented by the managers six arraigned the respondent
for misconduct as a member of the Commerce Court, six related
to his behavior while a district judge, and the final one was a
blanket indictment. The respondent denied the jurisdiction of
the Senate to make inquest into his conduct as a district judge,
and while the outcome was a verdict of guilty upon the drticles
charging improprieties in the office from which the Senate re-
moved him, its vote upon the remaining articles implies that the
Senate held to the conservative opinion that antecedent offences
could not be made the subject of impeachment. Senator Borah,
after expressing doubt whether a man could be impeached for
misdeeds in an office he had ceased to hold, said he would hesi-
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tate to establish such a precedent. Senator Works declared it to
be his opinion that such misconduct could not be made a cause
for impeachment, and Senator Brandegee expressed similar views.
Senator Root, in a brief written opinion, stated that he had no
doubt that the respondent was liable to impeachment for acts done
while a district judge and that the Senate had jurisdiction to try
him for such acts; and Senator Lodge concurred with him.
Senator Owen declared that it would be against public policy that
advancement to a higher place should preclude impeachment for
high crimes and misdemeanors in the prior office, not discovered
until after promotion had taken place.
3. There have been few impeachment cases in the history of
New York State. They may briefly be summarized.
The first was the case of John C. Mather, Canal Commissioner,
in 1853. The charges against him related apparently to mis-
conduct in office. The next was that of Robert C. Dorn, Canal
Commissioner, who was tried in 1868 for misconduct in office, and
acquitted.
The next case was that of George G. Barnard, a justice of the
Supreme Court, who was tried in 1872. He was found guilty
upon a number of the impeachment articles, removed from office,
and declared to be disqualified from thereafter holding any office
of honor, trust or profit in this state. It is sometimes said that
Judge Barnard was tried for misconduct before he took office.
Part of the testimony taken in the preliminary investigation re-
lated to charges of misconduct during his first term as judge.
Upon the trial of the impeachment proceedings his counsel stren-
uously opposed admission of proof to sustain these charges, but
the vote of a majority of the impeachment court favored its re-
ception. As to the significance of this vote I quote an opinion
which, having been pronounced long before the institution of
proceedings against Governor Sulzer, cannot have been biased by
recent events. In his "Constitutional History of New York",
Mr. Charles Z. Lincoln says that the decision of the impeachment
court which sat in Judge Barnard's case
"can scarcely be deemed an authority for an impeachment where
all the alieged misconduct occurred during a previous term, for
the reason that some of the charges on which the judge was con-
victed related to misconduct during his present term, and these
charges were obviously within the jurisdiction -of the court, and a
conviction on them was sufficient to sustain its judgment."
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Furthermore, it might be said that for purposes of impeach-
ment the judicial term was an entirety, and that acts done during
the earlier term might properly have been considered as reflecting
a light upon the character and temperament of the judge and
helping to explain conduct during the later term. But the
Barnard case is no authority for an investigation into acts done
altogether before entry upon office. No case that goes so far
was cited by counsel for the prosecution. A quotation from the
argument of Mr. William C. Beach, leading counsel for Judge
Barnard, may be pertinent. He said:
"I may have a morbid sentiment, sir, upon this subject; but it
is, to me, a remarkable spectacle that a court of impeachment
should be again and again convened in this state, and upon every
occasion we are driven to reason upon principles in regard to the
scope of its jurisdiction and its mode of procedure; that there is
no settled doctrine; that there is no organized mode of procedure
by which this court is to be governed; a court whose decisions
affect the most vital interests of the citizens of this government,
and of the government itself, left entirely to the spontaneous
guidance of its convictions at the time it is called upon to act !"
So far as there has been any expression of opinion in this state
it has been adverse to the broad claim of power. In the year
1853 when removal proceedings were contemplated against one
Philo C. Fuller, the Assembly asked its judiciary Committee for
advice whether a person could be impeached who at the time of
his impeachment was not the holder of an office under the laws
of this state; and whether a person could be impeached for mal
conduct or offences in a prior term of the same or any other office.
The committee reported to the Assembly as its opinion that a
person whose term of office had expired was not liable to im-
peachment and that the ,Constitution intended to confine impeach-
ments to persons in office and for offences committed during the
ierm of office from which the person was sought to be removed.,
3 The essence of the committee's argument is as follows:
"That the person impeached must have been in office at the time of the
commission of the alleged offence, is clear from the theory of our govern-
ment, viz: that all power is with the people, who if they saw fit might
elect a man to office guilty of every moral turpitude, and no court has the
power to thwart their will, and say he shall not hold the office to which
they have elected him; a contrary doctrine would subvert the spirit of
our institutions.
"Neither by the Constitution nor by our laws is there any period lim-
ited, in which an impeachment may be found; it is but fair, therefore, to
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In adopting the committe's report the Assembly passed the fol-
lowing resolution:
"Resolved, (1) That a person whose term of office has expired
is not liable to impeachment for any misconduct under section 1
of Article VI of the Constitution;
"(2) That a person holding an elective office is not liable to
be impeashed under sertion 1, Article VI of the Constitutino, for
any misconduct before the commencement of his term, although
such misconduct occurred while he held the same or another
office, under a previous election."
This resolution was in accord with the idea then embodied in
the statutes of the state. The act of 1784 under which the first
court for the trial of impeachments and the correction of errors
infer, that the intention was to confine the time to the term of office dur-
ing which the offences were alleged to have been committed, indeed, any
other conclusion would lead to results, which could not be sustained, for
who can say, but that the people knew of this mal-conduct, these offences,
and' elected the individual notwithstanding; true, an extreme case might
be put of fraud committed on the last day of the term of an office, to
which office the individual might be immediately re-elected; yet, who could
say this was net known to the people? How is the matter to -be settled?
The mere statement of the question shows the dilemma in which we would
be placed at every election, if the tenure or stability of an office depended
upon a legal enquiry as to whether the people knew the characters of the
individuals they had elected to office, and had exercised a proper discre-
tion.
"Hoivever much it may be desired to have men of high integrity and
honesty fill our public offices of trust and honor, yet by our Constitution
and the fundamental principles of our Government, no particular scale of
integrity, honesty or morality is fixed. No inquisition as to what char-
acter had been, can be held; it is enough that the people have willed the
person should hold the office. And the courts, which are but the mere
creatures of the public, will have no power to interfere.
"The Constitution provides, as we have seen, that a person cannot be
impeached after he is out of office, then if thq same person should be
re-elected to the same office, a year afterwards, would this right of im-
peachment be revived? In fine, by. his re-election, would he incur any
other liabilities, or acquire any other rights than those incident to his
present term of office? We think a moment's reflection would convince
every person that it could not.
"Again, could an officer be deprived of his present office by impeach-
ment for mal-conduct, in another and different office, or even the same
office, twenty yeafs before his present term commenced? If not, could he
after one year or one moment had elapsed? Where is the difference in
the principle; the time is nothing; the question is, is he out of office, it
matters not if he is the next moment inducted in."
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was instituted, was, with no important change, re-enacted in
1801, and again upon the general revision of the statutes of the
state in 1830.
In 1881 the legislature enacted a new Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure. It contained a section which may be urged as decisive
in Governor Sulzer's case, for it placed clear restrictions upon
the power of impeachment. Section 12, the section in question,
is as follows:
"The court for the trial of impeachments has power to try
impeachments, when presented by the assembly, of all civil of-
ficers of the state, except justices of the peace, justices of jus-
tices' courts, police justices, and their clerks, for willful and cor-
rupt misconduct in office."
This statute, if constitutional, should remove all doubt as to
the inability of the impeachment court to inquire into offences
antedating the Governor's assudption of office. The statute
expresses the legislature's view of the jurisdiction of the court of
impeachment. It is, to paraphrase Chancellor Kent, "a legisla-
tive interpretation" of the Constitution, which may be viewed as
an usurpation by the legislature or as a constitutional enactment
according to the bias of advocacy. Of an earlier statute-the
law as revised in 1830, which, following the Act of 1784, pre-
scribed that impeachment could take place only for mal and cor-
rupt conduct in office-Henry C. Murphy, who was one of the
state senators at the time of Judge Barnard's impeachment and a
member of the impeachment tribunal, used the following language
in one of his addresses to the court:
"There is a statute of our State, passed in 1830, before the
adoption of the present State Constitution, which enacts pre-
cisely the clause that is contained in the State Constitution of
1822, which provides that 'all civil officers may be impeached for
mal and corrupt conduct and for high crimes and misdemeanors'.
Now, it seems to me, without referring at all to what may be
impeachable at common law, that statute, expressly providing
that 'all civil officers may be impeached for mal and corrupt con-
duct,' and remaining unrepealed, the present Constitution may be
held to refer to and adopt it as a part of the law of the land, and,
therefore, a judge may be impeached for any maladiministration
or corrupt administration, and that it need not be a crime indict-
able in its nature, if, in the opinion of the court, it is a mal-
administration of the law."
If Senator Murphy's reasoning was tenable, by analogy the
statute of 1881 is constitutional.
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When the Convention of 1894 sought to revise and amend the
State Constitution it was presumably aware of the enactment of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, and with that knowledge it
placed in the new Constitution a provision which in effect had
formed part of every prior Constitution of the State, and which
is section 16 of Article I of the Constitution of 1894;
"Such parts of the common law, and of the acts of the legis-
lature of the colony of New York, as together did form the la'w
of the said colony, on the nineteenth day of April, one thousand
seven hundred and seventy-five, and the resolutions of the Con-
gress of the said colony, and of the convention of the State of
New York, in force on the twentieth day of April, one thousand
seven hunlred and seventy-five, and the resolutions o fthe Con-
or been repealed or altered; and such acts of the legislature of
this State as are now in force, shall be and continue the law of
this State, subject to such alterations as the legislature shall make
concerning the same. But all such parts of the common law,
and such rf the said acts, or parts thereof, as are repugnant to
this Constitution, are hereby abrogated."
The Code of Criminal Procedure having been passed in
1881, thirteen years before the assembling of the last Con-
stitutional Convention, and the Constitution providing that
every statute not expressly repugnant to its provisions "shall be
and continue the law of the State," the act of 1881 is constitu-
tional unless it can fairly be said to be repugnant to the Cofstitu-
tion itself. The word' "repugnant" means "inconsistent with",
"contrary to", "in conflict with", "irreconcilable with". None
of these terms is applicable. There is no repugnancy, but, on
the contrary, in the langnage of Senator Murphy, the statute
"may be held to be and to have been adopted by the Convention
as the law of the land". It is presumably constitutional, and the
burden is upon those who claim otherwise to establish its in-
validity. If the legislature -was competent to enact it, the im-
peachment court is interdicted from receiving, evidence that does
not tend to establish willful and corrupt misconduct in office.
The whole body of statutory law does not fall whenever a new or
revised Constitution is adopted. Many statutes would have only
frail support if their validity depended upon express warrant in
the Constitution itself. But wherever they antedate the Consti-
tution they are adopted along with it when it is ratified by the
people, and, unless plainly incompatible with it, they continue to
be the law of the state. Thus the constitutionality of the act
defining impeachable offences may be upheld.
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Constitutional authority to enact the provision of the Code of
Criminal Procedure restricting impeachment to wilful and cor-
rupt misconduct in office may be found in the provisions of sec-
tion 7, Article X, of the Constitution of 1846, which is continued
unchanged in the Constitution of 1894. Section 7, Article X, is
as follows:
"Provision shall be made by law for the removal for miscon-
duct or malversation in office of all officers, except judicial, whose
powers and duties are not local or legislative, and who shall be
elected at general elections, and also for supplying vacancies
created by such removal."
Whatever may have been the purpose of this provision, it gives
the legislature power to provide for the removal of certain state
officers, including the governor and the lieutenant-governor, for
misconduct or malversation in office. Here the Constitution
itself contains the idea that the cause of removal-should be mis-
conduct in office. This constitutional provision may be likened
to the language frequently employed in the Federal Constitution,
---"Congress shall have power to enforce this provision by appro-
priate legislation,"--the meaning being that the legislature may
determine what are impeachable offences.
Section 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is riot repugnant
to the Constitution for these reasons: (1) it is authorized by sec-
tion 7 of Article X. It makes provision for the removal of the
governor and other officials; (2) being tL statute passed prior to
the adoption of the Constitution of 1894 the language of that
Constitution expressly continues it in force unless it is irre-
concilable with the Constitution itself. The statute would seem
to have been constitutionally adopted and to have become part of
the law of the State.
4. Inquiry into the acts done by an elected official before his
accession to office is forbidden by a "higher law" than the Consti-
tution, which is that an elected servant is immune from prosecu-
tion by impeachment save for misconduct in office. The reason-
ing of Senator Owen in the Archbald case may have been sound,
-that it should not be possible to interpose promotion as a bar
to the impeachment of an appointed officer, but in the case of a
person elected to office, public policy prohibits any inquest by an
impeachment court or other removing authority into his conduct
prior, to his inauguration. It would be a pernicious doctrine,
susceptible of no end of abuse, that would allow an impeachment
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court to stay or reverse the results of a popular election. In
the long run it is far better for democracy that it should endure
the ills resulting from its unwise selections than that some heroic
recall remedy should be provided. The fundamental objection to
the broad jurisdiction, "the awful discretion", of an impeachment
court is that the people never intended to clothe any governmental
agent with discretionary power to remove its elected servants,
for that would be a power to nullify the results of an election at
the will of the removing authority. No power has been vested in
any impeachment court to revoke the popular verdict, to depose
the unfit. The people are nevertheless not compelled to endure
the presence of a convicted criminal in an exalted office. The
Penal Code in New York expressly prescribes that
"A sentence of imprisonment in a state prison for any term less
than for life, forfeits all the public offices, and suspends, during
the term of the sentence all the civil rights, and all private trusts,
authority, or powers of, or held by, the person sentenced."
In popular governments the people are habitually jealous of
their rights. They tenaciously insist upon the right of election,
-even the election of judges-when it would be better that these
should be appointed. They never willingly tolerate interference
with their prerogative of choosing their officers. As a check
upon the wrong-doing of public servants, the people have lodged
in certain constitutional agencies power to punish for misdeeds
in office. This limited power of removal has been delegated to
various branches of government, executive, legislative, and
judicial; but the power thus delegated is circumscribed. Power
to correct the people's mistake in electing-power to recall the
servant-was never meant to be conferred. If the power to
remove were as broad as the power to elect, one could be used to
neutralize the other. A court invested with absolute power to
determine whether the officer impeached ip "fit to continue in
office" is a tribunal that in effect may remove at will. There
should be some limitation upon its jurisdiction, otherwise in the
last analysis it has jurisdiction to remove at pleasure. The peop!e
elect and they recall at the close of official terms. To assume
that they have given unlimited power of recall to any agency of
government seems to me to conflict with the rights which they
have reserved to themselves. The Constitution of New York
provides various methods of removal. Officers may be im-
peached or may be removed by a more summary and less solemn
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process, as in the case of the superior judges by a joint vote of
the two houses of the legislature; in the case of county judges
by adction of the Senate, and in the case of certain county officers
-the sheriff, the county clerk, the district attorney, and the
register in counties having registers, by the governor. . All these
are constitutional methods of terminating the official life of the
people's elected servants. Sound policy, if not also the Consti-
tution, requires that removal be only for cause. Otherwise the
power to remove would be equivalent to a power to nullify the
people's will in electing. The people have never knowingly
granted to any court of impeachment or other removing authority
the power to remove from office for reasons which that court in
its uncontrolled discretion may decide to be sufficient, for that
would be creating an instrumentality to defeat the people's own
will. To describe the power of impeachment as "an awful
discretion"-if 'thereby it is meant to assert that the jurisdiction
of an impeachment court is boundless in extent-is to enunciate
a doctrine that runs counter to fundamental ideas of popular gov-
ernment. The people have clothed the court with no power to
unseat their elected' officers for any cause which upon the initia-
tive of the Assembly the court may choose to consider an im-
peachable offence. No such commission, we contend, has been
given to any authority vested with power to remove.
The subject may be.regarded from another point of view. No
court, however high and solemn its functions, is vested with un-
limited jurisdiction. No tribunal can or should be so consti-
tuted as to be in all circumstances the sole judge of its own
authority. No appeal lies from its decrees, yet it may decide for
itself what constitutes an impeachable offence, may depose the
offender and forbid his election to office in future! If this be
not. arbitrary power it would be hard to define what arbitrary
power is. To reply that the people have conferred it is to beg
the question, for the inquiry is: What is the nature and degree
of the power conferred upon the impeachment court? To those
who urge that its jurisdiction is such that no man in advance of
its decision can say how far its authority extends-that it de-
cides for itself what cases come within its purview-the answer is
that the makers of the Constitution never meant to confer upon
an agency of government-however important the agency-an
unlimited power, and that the Constitution can confer no such
authority upon any person, agency or court. That it was not.
knowingly and deliberately conferred would seem clear.
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It is said by way of answer that every court of last resort is
the sole arbiter of its own jurisdiction-that the Court of Ap-
peals, save in cases involving Federal questions, determines over
what subjects it has cognizance, and that the Supreme Court of
the United States likewise decides whether it may entertain a
controversy brought before it. But neither of these tribunals
has any such irresponsible power as is claimed for the court of
impeachment. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is de-
fined by the State Constitution, that of the Supreme Court .of the
United States by the Federal Constitution. Should either go
beyond ifs" authority, its judgment would be void, for no principle
of law is more firmly settled than this-that when a court exceeds
its jurisdiction its acts are a nullity, and lack of jurisdiction may
be urged at any time. But whether this be so or not, the judges
would be impeachable for usurpation of authority. Who, how-
ever, could impeach the members of the court of impeachment
for an unwarranted exercise of power, since it is the sole, abso-
lute and final judge of its own powers? A legislatture elected in
retaliation might prefer articles of impeachment and the court
summoned to pass upon the alleged offenders might uphold the
charge and remove them from office. That process, however,
might go on until the spirit of reprisal was exhausted, and noth-
ing would be. settled. Government would not then be proceeding
apon -constitutional principles, but upon the notion that whatever
a temporary majority may chose to do is right, which would prove
as fatal to liberty as to sound constitutional development.
A doctrine leading to such results must be abandoned. The
court of impeachment, like all other courts in civilized countries,
can act only within the scope of its manifest powers. It is not
a law to itself, it is the creature of law. It cannot usurp
authority, but must find a specific granty to justify its action. Its
powers do not reach so far as to enable it to pass judgment upon
conduct antedating the assumption of office or permit the removal
of any state official for any cause deemed fit, which can be estab-
lished by evidence.
These views accord with those expressed by the late Mr. Justice
Gaynor in Matter of Guden v. Dike (37 Misc., 390). Governor
Morton removed Guden, sheriff of Kings County, from office and
appointed his successor. When the new sheriff took possession
of certain books and papers of the office, Guden applied to the
Supreme Court for an order compelling the delivery of the books
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and papers to him on the ground that his alleged removal was
an unconstitutional and void act. The gravamen of the charge
against Guden was that in October, 1901, and prior to his election
to the office of sheriff, he had "made a corrupt promise to and
agreement with Bert Reiss to appoint him counsel to the sheriff
in consideration of his (Reiss') activity and influence in securing
influence and votes for that office in the election of 1901." Mr.
Justice Gaynor decided that this was an act done before Guden
took office and that the governor's power of removal extended
only to acts performed by the sheriff in office. The Appellate
Division decided that the performance of the corrupt agreement
was necessarily postponed to a period when Guden should become
a public officer and that the relation of the promise to the subse-
quent official tenure was so close as to make the act of entering
into such a corrupt agreement affect the usefulness of the officer
as cleairly and directly as could any misconduct committed wholly
after the official term began. In other words, the promise was
inchoate until Guden's election made it effectual. Although the
Appellate Division took the more correct view of the transaction,
the opinion of the Special Term Judge contains much that has
enduring value. Reasoning upon the assumption that the act
for which Guden was removed had been done and completed
prior to his accession to office, Mr. Justice Gaynor properly de-
clared that only acts in office could be the subject of attack, and
he added-
"To hold that it (the Constitution) also means acts committed
before the official came into office, would be to read into the
clause something which is not there, and which would be most
astonishing in this or any other free state if it were there; for it
would allow an appeal from the people who elect their officials
to the governor on the question whether the officials of their
choice should serve or not. The plain purpose of the provision
is only to make the official responsible as an official, i. e., for his
conduct in office to the governor and not to make him responsible
or answerable at all in his private character. * * * The common
law power of removal was for neglect or misconduct in office
only, as will be seen later on, except for indictment and conviction
of a crime so infamous as to render the offender unfit to hold
any office. It was in this light that this clause was framed and
it is this power and no other that was intended to be put in the
Constitution. * * *
"The power of removal for neglect or misconduct in office had
been exercised from time immemorial, and needed to be lodged
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somewhere, and the people lodged it in this instance through the
Constitution with the Governor. That they should confer such
power in respect of neglect or misconduct in office was in accord-
ance with our system of government, its history and traditions,
and established law and practice. That they should mean to go
further, and extend such power to the removal of officials at the
will of the Governor for anything he saw fit, whether committed
by them before or after they came into office, is an idea so con-
trary to our theory of government, its history and traditions, and
immemorial common law and practice, that it cannot be enter-
tained, since it is not expressed by the people in unmistakable
words. The setting up of such an appeal from the electors to
the Governor was never dreamed of."
Nothing in the opinion of Mr. Justice Bartlett at the Appellate
Division conflicts with these declarations, for the Appellate
Division concluded that the act in a sense was done or completed
after the sheriff took office.
The Court of Appeals decided that the Governor's power of
removal was executive, and not subject to judicial review where
it was shown that a charge within the contemplation of the Con-
stitution had been made against the sheriff and a hearing been
had. This limitation upon the executive power is made es-
pecially clear in Judge O'Brien's opinion. A "charge of some
official misconduct" is a prerequisite to action by the Governor.
The opinion of Chief Judge Parker seems to imply that the Gov-
ernor's power to remove was practically absolute, where charges
of some kind had been filed with him. If so, Judge O'Brien's
view is the sounder and accords with the doctrines quoted from
Mr. Justice Gaynor's opinion.
In considering the Guden case, Mr. Lincoln says that in his
opinion
"the Governor's power of removal is executive and he possesses
exclusive authority to determine the sufficiency of the reasons
which, in his judgment, justify the removal; and such determina-
tion is not subject to judicial review; but the courts may inquire
into the proceedings for the purpose only of ascertaining whether
the Governor had jurisdiction in the particular case, and whether
the procedure was such as the Constitution and statutes require."
By parity of reasoning the power of removal vested in the
court of impeachment or, in other words, the jurisdiction of that
court, is restricted. -It is no awful tribunal possessed of ability
to depose an official at will. Our system of government does
not warrant the exercise of any such irresponsible power. The
YALE LAW JOURNAL
idea of the existence of arbitrary power in any individual, body
or tribunal was vehemently and eloquently repelled by Edmund
Burke in his address upon the impeachment of Warren Hastings.
To the plea of Hastings that he possessed arbitrary power in
India which it was his duty to exercise at times, Burke made this
immortal answer:
"He have arbitrary power! My Lords, the East-India Com-
pany has not arbitrary power to give him; your Lordships have
not; nor the Commons; nor the whole Legislature. We have
no arbitrary power to give, because arbitrary power is a thing,
which neither any man can hold nor any man can give. *** Law
and arbitrary power are in eternal enmity. Name me a magis-
trate, and I will name property; name me power and I will name
protection. It is a contradiction in terms; it is blasphemy in
religion; it is weakness in politics to say that any man can have
arbitrary power. In every patent of office the duty is included.
For what else does a magistrate exist? To suppose for power
is an absurdity in idea. Justices are guided and governed by
the eternal laws of justice, to which we are all subject."
And he added that never in the history of the world had any
one heard
"'of an officer of government who is to exert authority over the
people without any law at all, and who is to have the benefit of
all laws and all forms of law, when he is called to an account."
Thesame principles were enunciated by Mr. Benjamin R. Cur-
tis in his defense of Andrew Johnson in language that may well
be recalled today. Curtis argued that the words "high crimes and
misdemeanors" implied the existence of some law or authority
by which they should be limited. It was not for the court of
impeachment at its own capricious pleasure to decide what con-
stituted a high crime or misdemeanor. "There can," he said,
"be no crime, there can be no misdemeanor, without a law, writ-
ten or unwritten, express or implied." Replying to General
Butler, one of the impeachment managers, that the Senate could
try Johnson for whatever it chose to deem an impeachable of-
fence, Curtis contended that the Constitution of the United States
had designated impeachable offences as offences against the United
States, had provided for the trial of such offences, establishing a
tribunal to try them, and had empowered the tribunal in case of
conviction to pronounce judgment and inflict punishment. Such
a tribunal was, 'he argued, a court; it could not be maintained
that it was "bound by no law". Speaking of the provision of-
the Constitution forbidding both the nation and the states to
pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law, he said:
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"According to that prohibition of the Constitution, if every
member of this body, sitting in its legislative capacity, and every
member of the other body, sitting in its legislative capacity,
should unite in passing a law to punish an act after the act was
done, that law would be a mere nullity. Yet what is claimed by
the honorable managers on behalf of this body? As a Congress,
you cannot create a law to punish those acts, if no law existed
at the time they were done; but sitting here as judges not only
after the fact, but while the case is on trial, you may individually,
each one of you, create a law by himself to govern the case.
"According to this assumption, the same Constitution which
has made it a bill of rights of the American citizen, not only as
against Congress, but as against the legislature of every State in
the Union, that no ex post facto law shall be passed,-this same
Constitution has erected you into a body and empowered every
one of you to say, Aut inveniarn aut faciar,--'if I cannot find a
law I will make one'. Nay, it has clothed every one of you with
imperial powers: it has enabled you to say, Sic volo, sic jubeo,
stat pro ratione voluntas,-'I am a law unto myself by which I
shall govern this case'. And, more than that, when each one of
you before he took his place here called God to witness that he
would administer impartial justice in this case according to the
Court and the laws, he meant such laws as he might make as he
went along. * * * I respectfully submit, this view cannot con-
sistently and properly be taken of the character of this body, or
of the duties and powers incumbent upon it."
The doctrine that the Court for the Trial of Impeachments
created by the Constitution of New York State is not a tribunal
with a shadowy, indeterminate, unlimited jurisdiction finds sup-
port in the reasonings of Burke and the arguments of Benjamin
R. Curtis. The Court has not been clothed with imperial powers;
it is not a law unto itself. Its jurisdiction is not so extensive as
to authorize it to dismiss the people's servants because in its
judgment they are unfit to hold office. This would trench too
closely upon the people's power of election by making the power
of removal practically co-extensive with it.
These limitations may not have been expressly stated, but they
inhere in the frame-work of government and are to be discov-
ered in the fundamental principles of law. Misconduct ante-
dating office seems never to have been a cause of impeachment.
There is a contradiction in the terms; the words are meaning-
less; the wrong-doing which it is the purpose of impeachment to
arrest and punish is an act in office or to be consummated in
office, as in Guden's case. All prior personal acts, except crimes
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against positive law, are pronounced innocent or are condoned by
election; and from that judgment there is no appeal. Crimes
against positive law may be established by indictment and trial.
The Penal Code provides that conviction shall be followed by loss
of office. When the Constitution prescribes methods of removal,
these are not inclusive of, but additional to, those established by
the penal law. No person holding the office of governor who
had been indicted for and convicted of felony could plead the
right to retain office because the organic law had not declared
that conviction of felony should be followed by loss of office.
Thus the provisions of the Constitution are harmonized with
sound and well recognized principles. Election should bar in-
quiry into all prior acts that are not crimes against the positive
law. As to acts done in the interval between election and as-
sumption of office, there should be no amenability to impeach-
ment because of the impolicy of allowing scrutiny into conduct
during this interregnum, lest investigation should result in defeat-
ing the ,people's will. There is no necessity for impeachment
for any misconduct done during this time, for if the act be a
crime, it is punishable by positive law, and removal from office
follows ipso facto upon conviction. It is better to guard jeal-
ously the right of the people to the service of the officer they have
elected, by forbidding inquiry by the impeaching authorities into
his conduct during this interval. If factional or party opposi-
tion might impeach him, the temptation at times might become
irresistible, especially where, as in New York, impeachment re-
sults in removal from office pending a trial before the impeach-
ment court. Election has rendered him immune from responsi-
bility to a court of impeachment not only for acts done before
election, but for acts done until he takes office. This was the
view of Mr. Justice Gaynor. In Speed v. Common Council of
Detroit (98 Mich., 360) and in State v. Common Council of
Duluth (53 Minn., 238), it was held that in this country there
is no authority to remove a person from office for misconduct
occurring before the commencement of his term. As was said
in the Michigafi case:
"There is no provision in the Constitution nor in the law which
prevents a person from holding office for misconduct in another
office which he held prior to the one to which he was elected or
appointed. We have .been unable to find any authority which
justifies removal for such previous misconduct. The misconduct
for which an officer may be removed must be found in his acts
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and conduct in the office from which his removal is sought, and
must constitute a legal cause for his removal, and affect the proper
administration of his office."
There should be some boundaries to the jurisdiction of a tri-
bunal that may not only remove from office but also close the
door to future office, thus cutting off all chance for popular vin-
dication. To declare that it may remove whomsoever it deems
unfit for office is to arm it with anomalous and dangerous power.
Impeachment proceedings are quasi-criminal in character, and the
law requires acquittal in cases of doubt. This maxim of law
applies equally in cases of doubtful jurisdiction. And jurisdic-
tion is doubtful unless it can be convincingly established.-
Mistakes made by the people at the polls should not be redressed
by recall at the pleasure of an impeachment tribunal. If the peo-
ple are left to suffer the consequences of their errors they will the
sooner learn how important is the work of nomination and elec-
tion. The ballot is a weapon for good or ill, and the sole security
for the future of 'democracy lies in its wise and intelligent use.
J. Hampden Dougherty.
New York City.
